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1 Preamble 
Offered from the perspective of a UK Professor of Art & Design, this essay is intent on 
encouraging you to think less about there being a clear and plausible distinction between 
theory and practice and to think more about the holistic world-constituting properties of 
what I posit as artistic intensity. This erosion of implausible distinction in favour of a 
distinctive holism I want you to see and apply to your understanding of and engagement 
with both the art academy context and to the actuality of art if you will. Indeed, one 
implicit polemical line of argument in this contribution advises of no salient distinction 
between theory and practice when one focuses on a particular reading of the ends of 'both' 
under the aegis of our newly-formed artistic intensity. 
In order to support your reading of the new terminology, and to begin the act of persuasion 
for its adoption, a pause here to offer a preliminary definition of this vocabulary. To 
somewhat pre-empt conclusion, artistic intensity must be understood in the fullness of its 
integrative (creative [and grammatical]) form. It is at once the act of integrated critical 
analysis and the impact of the particular quality of that integrated act. It is a critical and 
creative verb and it is a critical and creative noun; artistic intensity is a holistic voun. 
Artistic intensity is the act of that form of critical attention that holistically conjoins 
erstwhile theoretical understanding with practical transformation in a symbiosis that sees 
one become the other and both reappear as one in a new vocabulary and creative 
formation. Artistic intensity is the impact of the particular quality of cultural production 
born from that type of critical attention. Artistic intensity is all together a force that can 
remake that which is given in this world – with the remaking resident in the formations of 
the act, and in the reformations brought about by the impact of engagement with those 
formations. 
The chapter intent is supported by ideas drawn from, in particular, Pragmatist thought, on 
this occasion from Gianni Vattimo and Richard Rorty. Pragmatist writing represents a body 
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of diverse work that has informative resonance with goals and ambitions that might be 
regarded as common across the Art & Design sector in Europe and North America. 
Pragmatist ontologies are highly relevant to this debate and highly relevant to attempts to 
undermine the dualism resident in theory practice separation. Before Vattimo and Rorty, 
the work of Henk Borgdorff and James Elkins helps frame the persistent separation of 
theory and practice and points toward a Pragmatist endpoint for the particularities of 
artistic intensity. 
The essay is concerned with, firstly, the actual conjoinedness of theory and practice, the 
two things too often held apart. Secondly, working on the argument for conjoinedness from 
the opposite direction so to speak, the essay is concerned with actively doubting the 
dubious but recognisable rationale for holding theory and practice apart. That rationale is 
prevalent still in the art academy and dubious for being more political than disciplinary and 
often dressed speciously as philosophical. From this second critical direction, the essay tries 
to discern the shadowy shape of something pernicious in the rationale that would maintain 
an unchallenged dichotomy for theory and practice, for that rationale might be seen as one 
that is bonded to an anachronistic conception of discipline specialism that says more about 
the political predilections of formative disciplines as manifested in institutions than the 
substantiveness of art and design, or how art and design is made, or what those makings 
might mean, or how those makings might be significant in ways occluded by the very 
dichotomy designed to preserve the standing of both components. In short, there might be 
a lingering disconnect between aspects of art academy formations and the theoretical and 
practical reality of practice in practice as it were. 
Of course, given the opening sentence of the chapter, I can see the immediate paradox in 
maintaining the two concepts as distinct concepts even if only for as long as it takes to 
bring them ‘back’ together, but such is the demand of an academic preamble. Our 
community of Art & Design does indeed see, as do our distinguished editors, that, for 
better or for worse, there is a strand of Art & Design discourse that extends the two 
concepts like train tracks, having set off north from Hauptbanhoff Plato via Cartesian South 
to Coldstream UK Central, taking in a succession of intermediary stops of greater or lesser 
touristic academic interest en route. My chapter is, I hope, a mild provocation for 
3 
 
colleagues committed to that dualistic journey: a journey that masquerades as one with 
purpose by virtue of simple movement along those parallel tracks. 
Artistic intensity is to be understood here not as a container of parts nor as an indicator of 
symbiosis of two discrete things in simultaneous, aporetic harmony but, rather, as a 
description of whole singularity; the singularity of that mode of creative enquiry that 
peforms meaningfully to make the world perform meaningfully. Artistic intensity is 
predicated not upon passive reflection versus action but is grounded in the conception that 
it is only possible by a sophisticated endeavour of criticality which is as concerned with 
erstwhile theoretical apprehension as it is with practical manifestations and 
transformations, dependent as that attention is upon the needs of the inquiry and its object 
in the historical or contemporary world. 
For this author, at least for this essay, any creative endeavour (practical or theoretical some 
might say) that imaginatively and memorably critiques, remakes and redescribes our given 
historical and contemporary world so that we might see it more clearly as it was and is, or 
so that we might shape it to protect itself from itself and from us in the future, is an 
endeavour of artistic intensity, on the part of artist and audience as agents united in 
remaking, as I return to in conclusion. First I wish to contend with some of the thinking 
familiar to us that would seek to journey along parallel lines. 
 
2 Holding apart theory and practice 
Readers of this anthology will no doubt be familiar with the station stops through the 
history of ideas that add up to some kind of rationale for holding our two concepts theory 
and practice apart. I will not retrace what is a familiar route. I will, however, set down some 
of the salient points at issue with reference to key texts pertinent to our professional and 
intellectual discourse within Art & Design. 
In the important book, The Conflict of the Faculties (2012),i Henk Borgdorff contextualises 
his wider address of artistic research by delineating two principal types of theory operative 
in the Art Academies and in the dichotomic theory-practice worldpicture: 1) instrumental, 
technical theory of production and technique, and 2) interpretative, reflective, distanced 
critical apprehension of the made works of artistic production. Those who know Borgdorff’s 
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book will observe that I omit (for the time being) two additional Borgdorffian theory 
categories, performative and immanent, but I will come back to those two for I think they 
can in a certain sense direct us to what I mean by artistic intensity, and as such, can be seen 
to subsume the first two categories and serve for the whole. 
Broadly speaking, in Borgdorff’s schema instrumental theory is directed towards the 
accumulation of a body of knowledge and expertise used in the service of a specific artistic 
practice. It is a domain of ‘instrumental knowledge specific to the craft, needed to practise 
the art form in question’.ii Interpretative theory is chiefly concerned with reflection and 
understanding of artistic practice, often with the feature of historical distance. It is a 
domain of ‘reflection on artworks, or on the production or the reception of art, that rises 
above the level of the craft itself’.iii 
Borgdorff can see emphasis being placed on the second type of theory in today’s art 
academies. However, he attends to both types as salient elements of an art education 
delivered to students in discrete curricular ways that oftentimes belies their 
interdependence with the artistic practices that they serve adjacently in the normative 
academy model. 
Borgdorff describes very plainly what we all know to be the case that practitioners can be, 
to say the least, sceptical about theory. That multiheaded entity theory is or represents 
something that has a high-definition self-identity superior to the unknowingness of 
practice, of practical production versus interpretative reflection. This condition is already 
invidious, and we recognise it in the academy and in the actuality of the artistic world, but it 
is amplified as seriously problematic when it translates into difficult-to-shift petty power 
dynamics, where specialist, interpretative theoretical reflection arrives to animate, so think 
the arrivistes at least, the mute practical artefact. 
James Elkins has tabled a set of excellent explanatory analogies of the art academy critique 
that can help us see the theory practice dichotomy at work in our worlds, so too the 
distinction between instrumental and interpretative theory as detailed by Borgdorff. 
Elkins in his now legendary, ‘Why Art Cannot Be Taught’ (2001), describes one confusing 
aspect of the studio art critique where the ‘teachers waste time giving technical 
advice’.ivIdentifying as does Borgdorff the presence and power dynamics of instrumental 
5 
 
and interpretative critique at work in the exchange between student and tutor, Elkins 
suggests that students often complain that their tutors spend too much time in crits talking 
about technical aspects of art produced as opposed to addressing resident meaning. The 
instrumental looms in studio for it is an easier common denominator to ground time-
limited conversation for a one-to-one between student and (elusive) tutor. 
Elkins can also see that tutors who have skills with interpretative theoretical reflection and 
who are comfortable with meaning-making with the practitioner present can hold power 
over a practitioner less adept with the vocabularies of interpretative meaning-making. For 
Elkins, the dynamics of such a scenario are akin to the power dynamics of lawyer and client. 
He gives colour indirectly to Borgdorff’s sense of the overlording of interpretative theory 
when he writes:  
The legal metaphor is a very good way of thinking about the exercise of power in 
art critiques. A critique can be like the trials in Kafka’s novel of that name: the 
defendant’s attorney is either incompetent or absent, and either the jury is absent 
or the judges do double duty as jurors.v 
Elkins can see an equalising prospect in such a scenario, whereby the meaning-free 
practitioner and the meaning-full interpretative theoriser might wander around together 
divining meaning gradually and equitably. Conversely, and more commonly, the holder of 
power through the practice (deliberately so described in this context) of interpretative 
theory in this studio context can position practice in parallel on the lesser side of the 
dichotomy by keeping his interpretative theorist’s knowledge ‘mostly secret’ and his 
‘methods and rules […] difficult to perceive’.viThe theorist meaning-maker is both judge and 
juror, potentially, and the cowed practitioner who has merely produced an object of silence 
seems at the mercy of their Cartesian, dichotomic other. 
Art practitioners can be sceptical about theory, Borgdorff is undoubtedly right, but often 
the above interpretative theorist is also sceptical about practice, a psychological twist 
concealed commonly in the effusive expression of love by the self-appointed ‘mere 
theorist’ for the exotic products of the artist. The theorist clears her aversion for the silent 
aggression of much art by soothing the challenging dynamic with an interpretative theory 
poultice. She forces the objét, she thinks, to conform to normative meaning 
correspondence. 
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Those of us with enough experience of the workings of the art academy might look past the 
character actors in Elkins’s situation drama to the shadowy shapes of the producers in the 
background. These are the agents whose rationale for holding our two concepts apart 
might better be described as operational rather than intellectual, more political than 
philosophical. These producers are academic dramatists, often trained in the Modernist 
atelier, dramatists whose stagecraft (or is that institutional statecraft) is concerned with the 
invented purity of performing and making versus reflecting and interpreting. Their will for 
separation is fuelled by the organisational niceties arising from grouping certain 
components and methods of academy provision in certain areas of the academy’s estate; 
an ergonomic and formative-political act of dichotomy creation that underscores the 
overriding dualism with affiliated subsets: wet versus dry; dirty versus clean; hot versus 
cold; proactive versus reactive…and so on. Like a set of judges and jurors in Elkins’s sense, 
these producers (who have much more in common in the production than their given roles 
would suggest) reserve the right to bamboozle the student with methods and meanings 
difficult to perceive, and how could they be wrong if the very structure of the location of 
study seems built upon those methods and meanings. 
This is shadowy rationale for dualism that arises often tacitly from the combined (even if 
antagonistic) interests of the self-appointed practice purist and the self-appointed theorist 
meaning-maker. Ideology can play its part here, sometimes, but very often merely political, 
petty interests weigh in to maintain and sustain an organisational and operational dualism 
that requires the art academy student to produce messy (visual) and clean (textual) things 
during a course of study to satisfy the producers’ twin tracks of educational travel. 
Alongside the persistence of holding our two concepts apart we see lingering evidence of 
what might be described as ‘the spirit of Cartesianism’ in keeping with the Pragmatist 
critique of dualism of Charles Sanders Peirce. As explained by American academic, Richard 
Bernstein, this spirit for Peirce was all about the (unhelpful) continuation of ‘a framework 
of thinking that had come to dominate much of modern philosophy – where sharp 
dichotomies are drawn between what is mental and physical, as well as subject and 
object’.vii Peirce’s critique functions as a cornerstone of a great deal of Pragmatist thought 
and contextualises this offering in useful ways. 
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In our context the preservation of the theory practice divide is motivated by this spirit or 
attitude whereby the physical production of the art object is tempered or even justified by 
the mental practice of theory-subject. This is redolent of a Cartesian spectator worldview 
wherein the reflective mentalism of theory renders the artefacts of our world increasingly 
distant (ironically) in the attempt to render them more truthfully as they are in the world. 
Or is that sense of distance only felt by those for whom theory is not obtainable or 
practicable as a bridge from the obdurate physical to the sophisticated mental? If so, does 
not that worldview become political in an instant? 
Enough rhetoric: suffice to say for now, Elkins expertly describes the reality of the Cartesian 
split within the art academy studio and plays out for us something of the first two types of 
theory as intimated by Borgdorff. As noted, however, Borgdorff’s continuation of the 
typology of theory in the art academy points to a way out of the dichotomic bind and 
towards a Pragmatist conception of the two as an intense and singular whole. 
 
3 Artistic intensity 
As easily as we can recognise the two types of theory described by Borgdorff and enlivened 
by Elkins as well as the dichotomic standoff and power dynamics of theory versus practice 
dualism, we should all know, despite our academy niceties dear reader, that all of that is all-
too-simple for the actuality of all of that. 
Borgdorff’s latter two categories of art academy theory are useful from this point to see 
past this conventional dichotomic thinking. The categories are: performative and 
immanent. Performative and immanent in ‘Conflict of the Faculties’ allow the author to 
point out that, contra the rationale for dualism, ‘theory is itself a practice’ and that ‘every 
practice, every human action, is infused with theory’.viii And it is at this stage that Borgdorff 
alights upon the two components as in effect common elements in the singular endeavour 
of creative redescription. In his exploration of the performative nature of theory, Borgdorff 
puts this quintessentially Pragmatist thinking in this way, and paves the way for my 
inclusion shortly of Vattimo and Rorty: 
Whether we are dealing with the theory of linear perspective, classical rhetoric, the 
twelve-tone technique, set theory in serial music, or insights into the cultural 
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meanings and societal functions of art, the performative power of theory not only 
alters the way we look at art and the world, but it also makes these into what they 
are.ix 
This is a tricky argument to posit, and Borgdorff sees that, for he does not wish, usefully for 
me, to privilege theory as the last resort in the production of meaning. The problem is that 
in addressing ontological and practical similarity between theory and practice, one 
unavoidably keeps a wedge between action and reflection, between doing and thinking, if 
one asserts that both are infused with theory. The point at issue is to assert that the 
knowledge produced by way of artistic intensity is a product of thinking and doing, 
necessarily and recursively, as part and parcel of the definition of artistic intensity. As 
Borgdorff puts it, economically, both sides of the Cartesian binary ‘show a limited 
understanding of the interaction and reciprocal influence of theory and practice’.x 
The essential reciprocity of theory and practice is surely of such an order that the dualistic 
distinction is redundant. My developing view here is that persistent dualism is literally and 
figuratively divisive, and not a simple, benign redundancy. If that view is justified, it is not 
quite right to blithely see one influencing the other:  the holistic presence of both results in 
creative influence beyond the intricacies of the genesis of the work. In an intense meld of 
causation, ‘both’ are indispensable to the project of creatively constituting the world of art 
and the world in which art finds itself as Borgdorff’s combination of performative and 
immanent exhorts. 
Notwithstanding concerted effort from many, including commentators in this anthology, 
unfortunately the Cartesian spirit persists. As hinted, the persistence is in (large) part 
attributable to the persistence of institutional arrangements in Higher Education. The speed 
with which organisational formations do not change has shored up Cartesian conceptions 
of theory and practice as students have been shepherded through degree programmes 
where the two concepts are reified by departments, by money, by people, by status, by 
course materials, by assurance regimes, by reporting formalities - and by difficult-to-
eradicate attitudes towards the practical as somehow the manifestation of the uneducable 
and incorrigible expressionist trip-switch that would hold an individual separate from 
theory, reason, learning and transmissible knowledge. 
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In another publication seminal to these debates, and a là Peirce, Swedish academic Mats 
Rosengren expressed persuasively his impatience with the ‘barren dichotomies such as 
theory or practice, form or content, and discursive or intuitive knowledge’xi Knowledge and 
insight is produced for Rosengren by thinking, doing, acting and producing in and through 
these Modernist dichotomic nodes in the manner of a Derridean bricolage. This bricolage is 
the kind of integrated creative practice that Borgdorff can see in putative form shaping and 
expanding the horizons of the existing world. This type of creative endeavour is indeed 
constitutive of the world, no less, as Rosengren hails, and central to my conception of the 
programme of artistic intensity. Bricolage as a strategy for analysis as well as meaning 
production is of the same ilk as Pragmatist redescription. An invocation of the thinking of 
Italian intellectual Gianni Vattimo can assist this brief sketch and move us to a summary of 
artistic intensity as a contribution to a refreshed vocabulary for tackling the unhelpful and 
stubborn dualism. 
In his, 'Art's Claim to Truth' (1985), Vattimo addresses the significant stake that art has in 
the constitution of the world. This proposition he arrives at by identifying a dichotomy of 
the kind to frustrate Rosengren in the history of aesthetics. Contemplating art's relationship 
with representationalism and formalism, Vattimo observes: 
If the question of truth is not posed radically, when attempting to state it 
philosophically, and instead continues to be conceived in terms of correspondence 
with a ‘given’ state of affairs or (a variation of the correspondence theory) of 
syntactic and formal correctness, it will always necessarily oscillate between 
representationalism and formalism.xii 
Like Peirce, like Borgdorff, like Rosengren, Vattimo is tired of barren dichotomy and sees for 
art and prospectively for artistic intensity a more nuanced and more potent role in bringing 
meaning into the world. Vattimo’s brilliantly persuasive argument makes clear that creative 
endeavour is hobbled if it is tied to the instrumental programme of supplying information 
about the ‘state of things’, either the state of the world as observed from the perspective of 
the Cartesian spectator, or the state of the aesthetic as observed from the perspective of 
the reflective theorist. 
Instead, and through the power of artistic intensity to redescribe that which is normative 
and expected, the artwork (following Heidegger) has the potential as an artwork to ‘shock 
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or quake’ to suspend in the reader ‘all natural relationships, making strange everything that 
until that moment had appeared obvious and familiar’.xiii 
That both of our erstwhile elements have functioned in the appearance in the world of such 
a quake is so easily registered we can take it as read. The intensive and affective admixture 
that makes an artwork that radically re-proposes the world is one that evidences by default 
the mutual influence of our two-becoming-one components. 
 
4 Redescribing the dualism: ‘revisiting the rituals’ 
Back to Elkins before meeting Richard Rorty in conclusion. In the closing paragraph of ‘Why 
Art Cannot Be Taught’ Elkins invokes the heart of Pragmatist redescription in calling for a 
revisiting of the rituals that have become commonplace in the art academy in part because 
of the lingering parallelism of theory and practice. Lucidly, simply and yet expansively, 
Elkins pinpoints the Pragmatist enterprise with the following: 
What may appear to be unproblematic or inevitable ways of dealing with artworks 
can begin to seem like restrictive rituals; and then you’re free to ask whether or not 
other rituals might be better.xiv 
Elkins has expressed the Rortyan principle par excellence of redescription; we must 
redescribe our rituals, find new ones, and make new ones from there. The ritual expression 
of theory-practice dualism is tired and redundant, by applying the theory of artistic 
intensity in practice to the issue of theory-practice parallelism we might arrive at artistic 
intensity as a component of a new vocabulary to establish a new set of rituals to challenge 
and replace redundant dualism. 
Rorty’s abiding suspicion of those dualisms littering conventions of Western thought offers 
a great deal here to the thinking of Borgdorff and Vattimo (and Rosengren) and Rorty’s 
work undergirds my own artistic intensity such as it is and such as it might be applied to the 
redescription of the art academy. 
 
Rorty’s guiding principle of redescription mooted throughout this piece is predicated upon 
the ineluctable and universally valid idea that the world is changed through our active 
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interpretation of it. Our active interpretation of it cannot be either a normative description 
of the ‘state of things’ through either theory or practice, it has to be an engaged, intensive 
and active endeavour. After all, at the heart of Rorty’s thinking is the holistic idea that 
interpretation is both at once an academic, theoretical act and a physical and social impact 
– Rorty does not believe in the world and language, in practice and theory, as separate 
things, and neither, now, do we 
The vision of artistic intensity is to see and make the world as not fixed but transformable 
through imaginative and persuasive individual and collaborative creative production. To 
borrow from Rorty’s exposition of intellectual pragmatism, the vision is for artistic intensity 
to insist that we never reach a final vocabulary in our apprehension of a historical, 
contemporary and future world shared. 
Michael A. Peters and Paulo Ghiraldelli add further detail to Rorty’s programme as an 
educator and set down, I’d like to maintain, a guiding tenet for Pragmatist artistic intensity 
and in so doing map the purpose of Art & Design in holistic form. A role for education and 
artistic production is ‘the creation of metaphors’, but, in keeping with Vattimo’s 
determination to avoid offering ‘art’ that only reflects the state of things either 
representationally or formatively, ‘these metaphors cannot be understood as different 
forms of literal expressions’. As Peters and Ghiraldelli make clear: 
(Creative metaphors [born of artistic intensity]) must be understood as creative 
expressions that make people stop their old conversations and begin new ones. 
With luck, these novel expressions and new vocabularies will encourage in us a 
form of political maturity defined by the fact that it does not require anything 
external to us – the moral authority of a god – to secure our democratic institutions 
or to anchor our democratic processes.xv 
At this level we are, productively, some distance from politicised theory/practice 
antagonism in the art academy, and we are some distance from the dualistic parallelism 
that would seek to ground the disingenuous theory/practice separation on an academic 
footing. We face in conclusion a Pragmatist end goal for creative endeavour in holistic form 
that gives a life and purpose to artistic intensity. The art academy should make every effort 
to engage the vitality of the imagination in the creation and dissemination of things that 
can resist dualism, literalism, things that can exist instead in diverse and open creative ways 
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that might then coalesce and serve our redescribing with originary potential for the holistic 
apprehension of new worlds. 
Artistic intensity is all together an act and impact that can remake that which is given in this 
world: that remaking being resident in the formations of the act of artistic intensity, and in 
the reformations precipitated by the impact of artistic intensity experienced through 
widespread engagement with those formations. 
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